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RPKI ROV.

Every route announcement received by the DATAHUB-IX route servers is validated against RPKI. Invalid announcements are dropped — period.

How it works

We run three independent Routinator instances (one per live PoP), each pulling from the five RIR Trust Anchors. Validators feed the route servers via the RPKI-RTR protocol with a 5-minute SLURM-eligible refresh.

The validation outcome is encoded as a community on accepted prefixes:

  • 202192:2000 — RPKI valid
  • 202192:2001NotFound (no covering ROA)
  • Invalid announcements are dropped before the prefix enters the RIB.

Live counters (last 24h)

1.2M
Routes evaluated / day
640
Average invalid drop / day
3 nodes
Validators (Routinator)
< 5 min
Cache freshness

Publishing your own ROAs

Members are required to publish ROAs for every prefix announced. Most RIRs offer hosted RPKI in their member portals:

maxLength gotcha

Don't set maxLength wider than your most-specific announcement. A common mistake is creating a single ROA with maxLength=24 for a /22 — this opens forged-origin attacks for any sub-prefix you never announce. Keep ROAs as tight as your real announcements.

Verifying validation status

# Public validators that mirror RIR data:
$ dig +short txt 198.51.100.0/24.origin.asn.cymru.com
$ curl -s https://rpki-validator.ripe.net/api/v1/validity/AS65500/198.51.100.0/24

# Or use the DATAHUB-IX Looking Glass:
rs1.fks> show route 198.51.100.0/24 | match validation

BGPSec & ASPA

BGPSec is not yet enforced on the route servers. ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) validation is on the roadmap for 2026 Q4 — once the IETF draft becomes RFC.